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1: INTRODUCTION  
In light of the growing literature on the relentless rise of economic inequality in recent years, 
(Milanovic, 2012; OECD, 2011; Piketty, 2014; Therborn, 2014) the inability of modern democratic 
government to counteract these trends seems increasingly blatant. Even areas such as tax evasion, 
seems impossible to counteract from government despite an obvious public interest in doing so 
(Zucman, 2015). In this way the interaction between rising inequality and democratic institutions 
stands as a one of the central challenges of political thinking in the 21st century. The growing gaps 
between rich and poor and the increasing power of economic actors in the global financial market, 
undermines the control and authority of the traditional institutions of representative democracy. A 
recent quantitative study of the US by Gilens and Page (Gilens & Page, 2014) finds that the influence of 
the preferences of average Americans on the outcomes are much lower than affluent Americans, and 
that in situations of conflicts between the two groups, congress favours the preferences of the affluent 
in the large majority of cases. German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck directly speaks of the deep crisis 
and forthcoming end of democratic capitalism (Streeck, 2014). This paper will address this issue 
through an engagement with the classical concept of oligarchy, and to what extent it can be relevant 
for analysing the development of developed democracies. Section 2 will deal with the issue of 
economic inequality and elite power in the liberal and republican tradition of democratic theory. 
Based on this section 3 will look at the current literature on oligarchy, and section 4 will try to 
distinguish oligarchic influence from forms of more indirect economic power. Section 5 will try to 
analyse the post-war American history of the connection between money and politics through the lens 
of oligarchy.  
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2: INEQUALITY AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM 
Despite the increasing realisation of inequality as a political as well as economic problem, it seems as 
though contemporary political theory does not provide us with many tools with which to 
conceptualise this problem. In the liberal political tradition, threats to democracy have primarily been 
conceptualised as stemming from the excess of state power – authoritarianism and totalitarianism. 
The way to secure democracy has therefore been to curtail state power vis-à-vis non-state actors, be 
they in the market or civil society. The experiences of 20th century political lends a certain credence to 
these concerns, where time and again authoritarian executives overturned democratic government in 
coups, revolutions or gradual takeovers. In developed democracies today however, this does not seem 
to be the primary problem. The main threat to democracy is not the excess state power of the, but 
rather the inability to control powerful economic actors outside the state.  We see increasingly strong 
constraint on democratic institutions and the ability to influence and regulate economic processes. In 
this we seem to be experiencing a distinct move in power from institutions of democratic 
representation to that of unelected economic elites. As argued the liberal democratic tradition leaves 
us with very few ways of conceptualising threats from democracy, emanating from civil society, and 
not the state. Economic matters is conceptualised solely as the outcome of the political process, not as 
relevant for the process itself. As an alternative, the classical republican tradition sees issues of 
property and inequality as constitutive of the political process. As a consequence this means that such 
issues belong to the realm of politics proper, as a too skewed division of property and wealth, could 
undermine and corrupt the body politics (Thompson, 2007). Therefore the threat of oligarchy, and 
how to curtail elite power, was central for the parts of the republican tradition that prioritised 
democracy and popular power (McCormick, 2011).The centrality of wealth and class, for the political 
thinking of antiquity, can be seen in the fact that Aristoteles definition of different regimes, notably 
democracy and oligarchy, in Politics is grounded in the hegemony of different economic classes, rather 
than specific institutional features: “oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their 
hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers” (III viii 
1279b17–20)1. Machiavelli also sees the division of the republic into the rich and poor as a problem, 
and lauds the romans for their institution of the peoples tribunes, as a way of the plebeians to protect 
themselves from the predations of the patricians, and a as stop for elites to use the laws “not for the 
common freedom, but for their own power” (Machiavelli, 1996), 50). Contemporary scholars such as 
McCormick and Green have recently tried to use these reflections to advance a theory of Machiavellian 
or plebeian democracy (Green, 2016), where institutions such class specific offices, peoples tribunes 
and lotteries as ways of constitutional safeguards against elite encroachment of democracy.  
This is not meant to make any substantial argument about republican political thinking, only to use it 
as a conceptual inspiration, for thinking about economic factors as constitutive factor in the very core 
of the political process. By using class and inequality as political concepts, and specifically the concept 
of oligarchy, we can hopefully overcome the unfruitful division between the political and economic 
sphere, which has characterised much of social science in much of the 20th century2.  
 
                                                             
1 He even spefically states that  democracy, a concept hepersonally  opposed, was granted in class, rather than 
numbers. “Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and 
where the poor rule, that is a democracy” (III viii 1280a1–3). 
2 For more on the divisions on contemporary social science see Wallerstein unthinking social science.  
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3: A MODERN CONCEPT OF OLIGARCHY  
Recently a number of American political scientist have raised the question of whether the level of 
influence of a small, unelected and rich elite, means that the US can be characterised as an oligarchy 
(Gilens & Page, 2014; Jeffrey A Winters, 2011; Jeffrey A. Winters & Page, 2009). 
Most developed here is Jeffrey Winters, who in his 2009 book Oligarchy defines  oligarchy as a 
situation where a rich minority not only controls a large part of economic resources, but is also 
capable of mobilising political resources to defend this wealth. According to Winter’s definition 
Oligarchy is different from other forms of elite rule, in that it is based on a foundation of material 
resources that is independent of the state. Instead Oligarchs use state institutions for “wealth defence”, 
by peaceful or violent means. According to Winter’s US constitutes a civil oligarchy3, which means that 
A) oligarchs do not rule directly, B) oligarchs are disarmed and ‘tamed’, meaning that they are 
governed by a set of formal laws. In this context the wealth defence of oligarchs primarily takes the 
form of protection against taxation of income and property. The US oligarchy is defined by having 
sufficient economic resources to employ such means of wealth protection, including the use of tax 
havens, tax deductible foundations etc. In quantitative terms, this group includes the top 0,1% of the 
income distribution, with an average income of around 4 million dollars in 2007 prices (Winters 2011,  
215). Winters does not see an opposition between oligarchy and democracy. Oligarchs have common 
interest when it comes to policy areas concerning wealth defence, whereas other policy areas such as 
cultural or foreign policy, there is no consensus among oligarchs. Here different opinions of oligarchs 
cancel each other out, and leaves room for other forces to influence policy.  
While Winters account of oligarchy provides a good foundation for further studies of oligarchic 
influence, there seems to be especially two areas that need expansion.  
- Democracy and Oligarchy: while elements of democracy and oligarchy can obviously coexist in 
different institutional setups, the balance between the two elements shaped by different historical 
and socioeconomic context. Especially important here the balance of social and class forces, and 
the overall level of economic growth.  
o In a situation of high economic growth it is relatively easy to combine oligarchic wishes for 
wealth defence, with popular preferences for economic redistribution and welfare.  
- Historicization: Recent empirical scholarship on inequality has cast light on large historical 
developments in the resources and power of the economic elite. In the periods since 1945 it is 
possible to identify two, perhaps three, distinct phases in US oligarchy.  
 
4: TYPOLOGY – VARIETIES OF ECONOMIC POWER  
Elite encroachment of democracy can take many forms. In order to discuss the issue of potential 
oligarchic influence it is useful to distinguish between different ways elite influence in democracies 
can take place. The first distinction is that not all forms of elites power can be considered oligarchic. 
Oligarchic power resides in the possession of great economic resources based on private property 
claims independent of the state. State or party elites, who base their power on control over 
institutions, but not have independent personal property, as such fall outside the definition. Even 
                                                             
3 Winters distinguishes between 4 types of oligarchies based on the nature of rule and the role of oligarchs: 
Sultanistic, Warring,  Ruling and Civic (Winters 2011, 34) 
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when it comes to such independently rich individuals or groups, there are an range of avenues of 
potential influence on democratic politics. Therefore we need to distinguish between the structural 
influence of rich individuals as owners of capital and members of a societal elite, a form influence they 
possess whether they take any interest in the political system or not, and the direct influence such 
individuals can control, when they consciously mobilise their resources to gain political traction.  
Based on the current literature, I will propose three ideal typical forms under which economic power 
can translate into political influence under formally democratic regimes: Structural, Social and 
Political.  Structural and social power can here be seen as form of indirect power, while political 
influence is direct and driven by conscious actors. As such only the last form can be viewed as 
oligarchic power proper. While the boundaries between such ideal types will of course always be 
blurry, the categories allow for a distinction between direct political influence wielded by an elite, and 
structural/social forms of influence that would accrue to actors no matter what actions they 
undertook.  
1- Structural influence – the Kalecki effect 
The most pervasive and indirect way the economic power of the wealthy enters politics is through the 
power over investment. This is the indirect structural influence of business in a capitalist economy –if 
business invests it creates employment and growth, whereas if they withhold their investment the 
result will be stagnation. As such any political executive, be it national, regional or transnational, will 
have an interest in maintaining business “confidence”. This mechanism was first described by Kalecki 
in his 1943 paper “political aspects of full employment”, where he described the rationale for the 
business community to oppose state policies of full employment that, while giving a short term boost 
to business earnings, would infringe on this monopoly over investment in the long run and thus 
undermine business power (Kalecki, 1943). Political scientist Charles Lindblom describes how this 
structural power of capital owners constitutes an automatic system of rewards and punishments  that 
heavily constraints politicians in liberal democracies, and that “market systems imprison policy” 
(Lindblom, 1982) 334) 
This effect has heavily increased in the latter years, with financial deregulation, increasing capital 
mobility and access to cheap labour abroad. Now business can not only threaten to withhold, but also 
dislocate their investment, thus leading to increased pressure on national governments (Glyn, 2007). A 
further increase in this area is the increasing debt burdens of many governments, especially after the 
bank bailouts and aid packages following the 2008 crisis. This has led to a further increase in 
dependence by many governments on the international financial market, for refinancing sovereign 
debt. Wolfgang Streeck has described this tendency as by the metaphor that modern parliaments are 
torn between loyalty to two constituencies - the “Statsvolk” of their citizens and the other “Marktvolk” 
of creditors of the international bond markets (Streeck, 2014).  
2 – Social influence – The Mills effect 
The social or network influence comes from the integration of powerful actors into one coherent elite, 
that are socially integrated and shares certain worldview, ideas and cultural norms. The most 
prominent, if controversial statement of this comes from C. Wright Mills 1956 book The Power elite 
(Mills, 1999), in which  he stated that the main institutional order of the US of his day, the military, 
business sector and the government, had merged into a coherent power elite, forming “an intricate set 
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of overlapping cliques [that] share decisions having at least national consequences”. The integration of 
this elite was formed by social connectedness, educational and employment ties and cultural 
similarity.  
The importance of cultural norms and codes of social distinction in the reproduction of classes and 
elites, have in recent years perhaps been most forcefully formulated by Bourdieu, who in The State 
Nobility, shows the central role of elite institutions, cultural codes and informal network and family 
ties, in the formation of the, nominally meritocratic, elites in France, Britain and the US  (Bourdieu, 
1996). Michael Useem’s 1984 book The Inner circle (Useem, 1984), showed the deep integration of 
American business through a network of interlocking directorates, where a relatively small group of 
managers and owners of large corporation were tightly connected. This inner circle was therefore able 
to mobilise.  Scholars have also suggested the formation of a trans-European business elite, tightly 
connected to the EU system (Van Apeldoorn, 2000). In Denmark (Ellersgaard & Larsen, 2015) have 
recently used quantitative network analysis to identify a highly coherent power elite in a dataset of the 
entire economic, organisational and political elite of the country. At the same time increasing interest 
have been focused on the revolving door between politics, business and lobbying. Here former 
politicians and administrators are often hired by business or lobbying interest, creating social bonds 
and networks that criss-cross the divisions between state and markets (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-
Rosen, 2012). Powerful firms such as Goldman Sachs have also managed to place former employees in 
a range of powerful positions, such as Mario Draghi in the ECB or Hank Paulson in the US treasury.  
The yearly summit in Davos, as well as other more secretive gatherings such as The trilateral 
commission, also serves as venues where leaders of business, politics and media, meet, socialise and 
informally coordinate ideas and worldviews. (Knudsen, 2013) 
3 – Political influence – the Koch Effect 
In contrast to the first two forms of elite influence, direct political or oligarchic influence, requires the 
active and conscious application of economic resources with the goal of influencing policy.  This can 
take the form of investments in think tanks, lobbying operations or direct campaign contributions, as 
well as the building of political front movements. This can either take place via collective organisations 
pursuing general class interest or individual persons, firms or foundations, pursuing more 
idiosyncratic political aims.  
Collective organisation such as the American Chamber of commerce or European Roundtable of 
Industrialist, generally concern themselves with general business interest, such as the lowering of 
taxes and public spending, keeping wages and unions in checks and lowering the burden of regulation. 
In their 2010 book Winner-takes-all Politics political scientists Hacker and Pierson described how the 
American business sector, through the 1970s and 1980s launched a successful campaign of political 
mobilisation, which managed to transform both the republican and democratic party towards a policy 
stance more favourable to business and the affluent (Hacker & Pierson, 2010).  This influence can also 
take the form of individual firms or persons pursuing their own economic or political interest through 
the same means. The paradigmatic example of this is the empire build by Charles and David Koch in 
the US, to spread their political agenda of radical economic libertarianism (Mayer, 2016). While the 
Koch brothers have augmented their own sizeable political donations by channelling donations of 
other rich individuals, their empire is nevertheless not bound by any representative structures. 
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Through their support of the Tea party the Koch brothers have considerable personal influence of the 
republican party, mainly or primarily through economic power (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012).  
 
Table 1: Types of influence  
  Sphere Mechanisms Mode Thinkers  
Structural  Economic Investments, 
capital flight, 
tax evasion 
Indirect Piketty, Boyer, Lindblom, 
Marx, Streeck, Kalecki, 
Zucman 
Social  Economic 
+ non-
economic  
Revolving door, 
elite education 
Indirect Mills, Useem, Mizruchi, 
Bourdieu  
Political/ 
Oligarchic 
Collective Economic Revolving door, 
political 
contributions, 
think tanks,  
Direct  Domhoff, Marx, Pierson, 
Blyth  
Individual  Economic 
+ non-
economic  
Political 
contributions, 
think tanks, 
philanthropy , 
foundations  
Direct  Mizruchi, Winters,  
 
5: OLIGARCHY IN THE US 1945-2016 
Elite influence has been crucial throughout US history and the original formulation of the constitution 
where large extent shaped the original formulation of the constitution. (Beard, 1913; Thompson, 
2007).  To track recent development modern developments can be traced to the Post-war settlement, 
however. Emerging out of the depression and the New Deal, a regime of embedded liberalism emerged 
(Ruggie, 1982). This involved a compromise between labour and capital, where the survival of private 
ownership in the economy was combined with a strong widening of welfare services and rising wages. 
This compromise entailed clear moderation from the side of the American oligarchy, and was 
motivated by the threat of communism, the strength of organised labour and the ideological weakness 
of economic liberalism in the aftermath of the depression. This moderation was led by a pragmatic 
core of the leading capitalist of the time, dominated by scions of large manufacturing corporations 
such as Ford and General Motors (Mizruchi, 2013).  
The post war compromise did not last however. From the 1970s in an atmosphere of crisis and falling 
growth rates, the country experienced an unprecedented mobilisation of business interests. The aim of 
this was the restoration of the squeezed profits of corporate America, through a direct involvement in 
federal and state politics. Hacker and Pierson describe how business leaders, under pressure from 
both labour and new environmental and consumer movements, undertook a more radical political 
stance, and active participation in the political process. This strategy quickly delivered political results, 
with the first successful tax reduction for the rich in the Carter years, and a wave of both tax reforms 
and economic deregulation to the benefit of corporation and the rich. But there was also stronger 
structural influence on the political system, where the new flow of money from corporate and private 
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donors, to political parties and think tanks, meant that politicians from both parties became increasing 
dependent on private money (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). 
In this successful mobilisation the business sector focused on broad issues, like tax, unionisation, 
regulation and government spending that brought broad benefits to the capitalist class as a whole. But 
the successes of the 1980s and 1990s, which meant that the incomes of the top 1% started to climb 
dramatically, and oppositional movements were weakened, also meant that the outside pressure on 
corporate America started to wane. In the fracturing of the Corporate Elite Mark Mizruchi describes 
how the relative cohesive elite of the post-war and early neoliberal period, started to fragment by the 
1980s. Here a new generation of CEO’s focussed on maximising their own and their companies’ bottom 
line, and left the business community as a “collection of large corporations that while increasingly able 
to realize their firm-specific interests through lobbying, were increasingly less able to provide 
collective solutions to issues of concern to the business community, and the society, as a whole.” 
(Mizruchi, 2013, 13)4. This fracturing of the cohesiveness of the American economic elite in the late 
20th century also manifested in the increasing rise of individual oligarchs, spending inherited or 
corporate fortunes to advance personal political ideas. Spearheaded by figures such as Richard Mellon 
Scaife and Charles and David Koch, a new generation of rich individuals employed tax-deductible 
charitable foundation, as channels of political influence, through funding of university chairs, think 
tank, and citizens groups.  While a few of these new oligarchs have liberal views, George Soros 
prominently them, the majority are on the right, and a sizeable portion are on the extreme right(Mayer 
20016).  Most notably here the Koch Brothers, whose empire of party finance and foundation have 
helped drive the Republican Party rightward. This development reached its apex in the period up to 
the 2010, where the Koch Brothers, through Tea Party movement, were able to use primary challenges 
and campaign donations, to send the most political extreme  
Theda Skocpol describes the development in The Tea Party and the remaking of Republican 
conservatism: “The ideological shift from the 111th to the 112th Congress was extraordinary— indeed, 
larger than any previous shift from one House to the next, including the change that occurred in 1994, 
when Republicans displaced Democrats from control of the majority for the first time in decades (…) 
Why would Republicans today take such an extreme stance—and do so virtually unanimously? The 
answer lies in the ideological and punitive pressures that come from vigilant wealthy interests in the 
orbit of the GOP.” (Skocpol 2012, 185-87). 
Table 2: historical phases of US oligarchy  
                                                             
4 This picture of a fragmented business sector is also seen in The business of America is Lobbying (Drutman, 
2015) 
  Elite 
cohesion 
Elite power  Mode of 
governing  
Dominant 
political stance 
Post-war 
settlement 
1945-73 Strong Low Class 
compromise 
Moderate  
Neoliberalism 1973-2010 Strong High Unified 
oligarchic  
power 
Conservative  
Oligarchic  
neoliberalism 
2010-> weak high Fragmented 
oligarchic 
power  
Ultraconservative/ 
Fragmented 
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At this point, the fragmentation of the oligarchic influence means that the mainstream of the business 
community were losing control over the Republican Party, to a new generation of radical libertarian 
and far right congressmen and their oligarchic backers. In such a situation the transition from 
collective and organised corporate lobbying to fragmented oligarchic competition meant that 
mainstream political donors proved increasingly unable to control the Republican Party, the party that 
since the 1970s had been the main conduit for oligarchic influence.  
A development that showed itself even stronger in the presidential primaries. In 2012 the process 
dragged out for months, as radical fringe candidates were able to find easy oligarchic backing to 
continue challenges to the mainstream candidate Romney. In the 2016 election Trump stand as an 
ambiguous figure. On the one hand, he represents the natural continuation of the increasing oligarchic 
involvement in politics. Where the Koch Brothers were puppet masters of the political theatre, Trump, 
himself billionaire oligarch, steps directly into the stage. On the other hand Trumps populistic political 
platform, with opposition against free trade and immigration, stand in opposition to most of his 
political class. As such, he is rather more like the populares of the late Roman Republic – members of 
the senatorial class that catered to the allegiance of the plebeians for advantage in the political 
oligarchic competition.  
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